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Introduction
Industrial process plants are normally supervised by a complicated
instrumentation system which, in co-operation with one or more human
operators, controls the process under general routine conditions, such as
normal operation and start-stop operations,, and monitors the operation in
such a way as to allow abnormal conditions to be detected and counteracted
by suitable, i.e. safe. and economical measures.  The allocation of tasks to
operators and instrumentation depends upon the degree of automatization,
and the requirement of narrow operation tolerances and operation close to the
tolerable limits for plant components has to a great extent led to
automatization of the normal operation, while abnormal operation and fault
conditions still require highly qualified actions by the operators.
The situation is then that several tasks connected with the normal
operation are taken out of the hands of the operator.,, who thus loses touch
with the plant, at the same time as the steadily increasing complexity of the
plants during abnormal conditions places on the operators the demand of still
more knowledge of the functions and reactions of the plants.
Even in plants having a very high degree of automatization of normal and
abnormal operation, situations will occur in which the human operator has to
control the operations, for example the initial operation following the
installation of new, major parts or major repairs,, and the longer the periods
are between such demands on the operator, the more efficient the means 6f
communication between the plant and the operator have to be.
The digital computer is now finding its way into the control system of
automatic plants.  Up to now it has been used especially for information
processing in connection with automatic control and monitoring of plants.,
but not to any great extent for improvement of the communication between
plant and operators.
In the present report the tasks of An operator at an automatized plant are
discussed With a view to formulation the ba8is for an appraisal of the
possibilities of using the digital computer to improve this communication.
Co-operation between Operator and Instrumentation
The tasks in which the operator and the instrumentation system co-operate
may be classified into several different functions.  The measuring function,
which is the conversion of representative variables in the process into signals
suitable for further data processing, is at present carried out almost entirely
by transducers in the instrumentation system, although in certain types of
2plants the capability of operators of detecting small changes in the operation
by otherwise undefined changes in the odour or noise conditions is still
utilized.
The control action,, which conversely transforms the signals from the
instruments into changes in the parameters of the process by means of
actuators, can to a great extent be mechanized., but the function is often
carried out by operators in cases where the frequency of control actions is so
low that mechanization is uneconomical.  Besides, manual control may be an
important stand-by for normally automatic actions.  The data processing ties
measuring and control together and is the function, requiring the most
complicated co-operation between operators and instrumentation.  In complex
process plants this co-operation places great demands on the information
display function, which by means of sound and light signals, meter
indications and graphic recordings converts the information present in the
signals of the instruments into a form that can be further processed by the
operators.
It is a condition for the development of automatization that the necessary
data processing can to an increasing degree be carried out in the
instrumentation system without any action on the part of the operator; this in
turn means that the equipment required for advanced data processing must
be accurate, economical and reliable.
An electronic system, to be economical and reliable, miist be based on
units., produced in numbers, and the development of the practical
possibilities of automatizing process plants has been characterized by the
mass-produced electronic process controller, which is so flexible that the
same type of unit can be adjusted to a wide variety of processes.
During recent years the development has been highly influenced by the
digital computer, which is a mass-produced, end thus reliable and
economical, unit that can be fitted by programming to meet highly advanced
and specialized needs for information processing in process automatization.
This feature, together with the high operating speed of the computer, which
makes it possible to share its time among many functions and thus perform
these with a reasonable amount of equipment, makes it attractive to utilize
the digital computer in process instrumentation even though its highly
centralized structure is not very attractive for instrumentation purposes from
a reliability point of view.
The high degree of interconnection between the different functions of the
digital computer may lead to serious consequences of
faults In the instrumentation, besides it makes it more difficult for the
operating personnel to maintain a general understanding of the functioning of
the system.
3The rapid development of the prices of integrated circuits and subsystems
and thus of digital computing elements will presumably in the future
contribute towards a continuation of the decentralized structure that
characterizes conventional instrumentation systems, since it will be attractive
from a reliability (decentralization) as well as an economic (simpler
programming) point of view to use control-systems comprising several
computing elements.
The introduction of the digital computer in process instrumentation should
thus not be -looked upon as a revolution, but as an evolution of the
technological and economic possibilities of further utilization o-f automatic
data processing, in the instrumentation,, and it is still important to base the
layout of instrumentation systems and their adaptation to the process and the
operator on the vast experience gathered from the operation of conventional
systems.
Especially in its relation to the operators in industrial processes the digital
computer has been encumbered with the tradition established by its users in
the administrative and scientific fields; communication facilities -,uch as
typewriter and@tine printers have been transferred directly from these fiels to
the industrial scene, where in most cases they will be inexpedient.
In order to formulate the demands on a suitable form of communication
between operator and plant it is necessary to define the functions of the
operator in more detail.  In the following discussion his tasks are classified in
a simple way into groups covering: tasks during normal operation, during
changes in operating conditions such as start-stop procedures, and during
monitoring, e.g. detection and identification of failures.
The Operator's Task during Normal 0peration
During normal operation periods the operator and the instrumentation in
co-operation are to ensure that the process plant as a whole is in an
economically optimal condition.
Regardless of the level of automatization, the operator for this task needs
accurate information of the main data of the pln-nt., presented in a way that
allows him to compare directly with the primary operation specification given
to him.
These principal plant data are normally presented to the operator by big,
clear Indicators located In a central position which allows them to be read by
the operator even if he is carrying out other tasks.  In conventional systems
meters of great size or indicators/recorders are often used.  The main data
should be compared with the primary specification to a good accuracy; they
4are not to be compared mutually, end therefore presentation in digital form
with indication of measuring units should be preferable to analogue
presentation.
In plants with a moderate level of automatization the control of the normal
operating conditions is often carried out by a number of rather simple
feedback controllers, which control the individual plant parameters in
correspondence with secondary references adjusted by the operator to satisfy
the primary specifications.
For this function the operator needs more secondary information about the
conditions in the different feedback loops to be able to supervise the result of
his adjustments.  In this respect there are not special demands on the layout
of the display equipment.  The operator will be able, without hurry, to act on
the basis of his daily experience, and his task will normally be well defined
and limited. This intervention in the operation of the plant, based on his
evaluation of the operating conditions and specifications, will be of an
experimental nature, he can use P. trial and error technique in a reversible
way and correct his actions if they prove wrong.  In this situation the
operator's working conditions are favourable provided that the
interdependence between the primary operational specifications and the
secondary control reference values is not too complicated.
To make the operator responsible for the adjustment of the control loon
references - set points - may be advantageous to his other tasks.  Different
operators may have different ideas of the optimal operating conditions and
therefore may have a tendency to check the adjustment of the set points at
shift take-over and during operation to make sure that conditions are optimal.
This frequent experimentation with the process will contribute to the
operator's understanding of the behaviour of the plant and thus increase his
ability to perform a monitoring function.  This may be of importance for plants
without frequent manual start-stop operations.
At higher levels of automatization the different set points in the control
loops will be calculated by the control system itself and automatically brought
into correspondence with the primary operation specifications, and the role of
the operator during normal operation will be purely supervisory.
The Supervisory Task
This task, to which both the operator and the instrument system
contribute., may be divided into three parts: failure detection, i.e. the
discovery of a departure from the normal, specified operating conditions,
identification, i.e. the determination of the nature, location and cause of the
5abno7-mal condition., and finally the corrective action upon the process,
,ihich is based on an evaluation of the consequences for the plant of -the
different possible modes of continued operation and a. decision regarding the
optimal action.
Detection of failures is usually not possible solely on the basis of the
information utilized by the operator during normal operation optimalization,
since a large group of abnormal situations and failures will not appear in this
information or will be recognizable here at too late a stage.  The operator
should therefore have at his disposal detailed information on the state of
operation in the different subsystems of the plant.
A great deal of this information is not needed by the operator for his
optimalization of the normal operation; he only has to check that the data
remain within the range of normal operation.  Most of these secondary data
have no immediate correspondence with the primary specifications for the
plant operation, and it is therefore important to lay out the display function in
such a way as to increase his awareness and his memory of the normal
ranges.
Normally this is done so that the instrument system compares fixed limits
with measured data representative of abnormal situations demanding
immediate action by the operator, and gives a warning signal when the limits
are exceeded, while failures that have only minor consequences for the
operation of the plant are covered merely by the measuring dat,,- being
presented to the operator.
This presentation has to be such that the operator only has to run an eye
over the instrument panel to ascertain whether the operation is normal.  The
layout of the control console can facilitate this task to a high degree even in
conventional systems: related measuring data are grouped together, normal
operating conditions are indicated clearly, for example by edge wise meters
arranged so that the hands are normally in line., or meters that can be
rotated so that the hands normally point in the same direction.  Meters have
to be grouped so as to clearly indicate the different subsystems.
The essential thing in this connection is to obtain an overall view of the
process by inter-comparison of data rather than a high accuracy reading of
individuE.1 data.
The great data handling capacity of the digital computer can be utilized to
relieve the operator of the failure detection task in a very efficient way.  The
monitoring of the measuring data can be highly effective, a great number of
data can be included in an automatic alarm scanning, and the alarm limits
may be made dependent on the operating conditions of the plant; for instance
they can be changed during start-up.  Furthermore the digital computer is
able to monitor the relation between data by making simple comparisons or
6more complicated calculations such as heat or mass balances, and in this
way the instrumentation can be made more efficient and alert than the
humqn operator.  It may be considered R drawback that one takes from the
operator a task that keeps him in touch with the process, which is essential
for his correct action in failure situations.  For the operator to be effective it is
therefore necessary that he has the possibility of obtaining  and maintaining a
general view of the conditions of the plant.
When an abnormal state of the plant has been detected., the failure has to
be identified with good certainty and its cause and the consequences upon the
continued operation must be evaluated.  To the operator this is quite a
different task from the normal optimalization of the operation.  In case of
more serious failures the allowable response time may be short; the task will
not be to solve a well-defined problem, but rather to formulate the problem
corresponding to the pattern of data presented.  The situation will be
characterized by a set of abnormal data, each of which may occur rather
frequently during the daily work (e. g., instrument failures), but which in just
the combination in question may have been caused by a serious or dangerous
failure that would have been considered very improbable in advance.  This
means that the operator is not allowed to trust his daily operating experience
but has to base his decisions on detailed knowledge of the functioning of the
plant and its response to the different types of failures.  He should be
imaginative enough to Postulate a covering set of npossible causes of the
failure situation on thc-, basis of the immediately available information and
then., after processing of more detailed information, to make Fi, well-founded
decision.
The great difficulty is usually to ensure - by training, layout of control
console and plant, etc. - that the correct and in many cases very improbable
cause of a failure is among the possibilities that occur to the operator.
Experience shows that an incident is not seldom allowed to expand, not
because the instrumentation fails at the critical instant, but because the
explanation of the abnormal situation that first comes to the operator's mind
by virtue of his experience corresponds to more trivial routine failures,
whereas less probable failures have much more serious consequences for the
plant and should therefore have absolute priority in his mind.
If one chooses to define the cause of such an incident as a human failure, it
is very reasonable to discuss whether the blame should go to the operator or
to the designer, who chose the information environment of the operator.  In
quite a few cases such failures may be classified as "technical failures" since
the development of the incident may be due to a rather high frequency of
unimportant failures that have contributed to the experience of the operator
and thus influence his reaction in the case in question.
7In his task of identifying the failure and evaluating its possible consequence
for the plant, the operator must therefore be supported by the designer of the
system.  The information directly available in the form of measuring data and
alarm data has to be displayed-in a suitable way, and the operator's need for
knowledge of the reactions of the plant to failure conditions must be
supported as much as possible by incorporating the designer's knowledge into
the instrumentation in the form of automatic evaluation procedures that
analyse the alarm and measuring data patterns.
In modern plants the task of the operator in an abnormal situation is
initiated in the way that an alarm system detects that one or more measuring
data have exceeded the range of normal operation.  In small plants it is
possible for the operator to get a sufficient overall view of the situation on the
basis of a simple indication of the individual alarms, but an alarm system
does not have to be of very great size to necessitate special means of
supporting the operator.  In conventional systems this is done by indication of
the latest alarms in a way that separates them from earlier ones by a different
character of light, by special indication of the first alarm in a sequence, etc.
Where it is chosen to use an extensive alarm system in a larger plant - e.g.
by installation of data loggers or digital computers - so that a great number of
variables are monitored, perhaps even with alarm limits depending upon the
operating conditions of
the plant, the operator will lose his general view if the output information is
presented to him unsorted.  The more detailed monitoring will result in long
sequences of secondary alarms, and it may be of important assistance to the
operator that the designer incorporates in the instrumentation as an
automatic sorting Procedure the result of an evaluation of tire reactions of the
plant in such a way that the operator is presented with information on the
primary and essential alarms only to an extent sufficient for the preliminary
identification of the failure.  It is not appropriate to record the alarm
information in tabular form with typewriters or line printers.  A clearer
Presentation is obtained with plain text incorporating parameter identification
and data in conventional alarm status displays or computer-controlled picture
displays (CRT), which might also be utilized for the presentation of results
from the more comprehensive analyses mentioned below.
The information from the alarm system will normally only be able to serve
as a rather course guide in the identification of a failure and to locate the
failure to one of the subsystems of the plant.  The operator must supplement
this information with a survey of the conditions in the plant as a whole end in
the subsystem in question.
Such a survey comprise:3 sets of related data characterizing the actual
operation conditions.  Experience shows us that a human operator is able to
8accept a large amount of information directly when it Is presented to him in
analogue form as a situation or a picture, while information in alphabetic or
digital form requires conscious acquisition by detailed reading, a slow and
very selective procedure.
Analogue presentation of measured data by means of meters and recorders,
as normally used in conventional systems, can give the operator a good
overall view of the operation if nrcperly laid out since he need not go into
detail in reading the meters, but can perceive the meter deflections as a
rattern.  In his preliminary failure identification he has no need for accurately
measured individual data., but only for comparison and classification of data
in sets.
In case a digital computer is used in the instrumentation there are further
possibilities of supporting the operator in his survey of the operating
conditions.  Related measured data can be coded by the designer into series of
graphic pictures representative of the plant as a whole and of subsystems,
which may supply the operator with a very efficient means of comparing data.
By thus elaborating a number of graphs giving surveys of the conditions in
representative systems, functions and situations,, the designer may ensure
that the operator is presented with all relevant data in close relation as a
supplement to the alarm information.
Already at the formulation of his first hypothesis about the cause of the
failure the operator will thus have all relevant information available in a clear
forms This will increase his possibility of finding a correct explanation as the
first one, and he may avoid the hesitation and fidget in which he may find
himself if he has to change his working hypothesis several times because
important new information turns up when he evaluates the detailed data to
confirm his findings..
An efficient coding of the information in sets as graphic patterns will also
counteract-, the tendency of a human operator to limit his attention to very
1'ew parameters in a critical situation and to let the hypothesis he has
already made influence his interpretation of the supplementary information
he is seeking.
The most important feature of these graphic Patterns or pictures is that
they give the operator that overall view which in conventional systems he can
get by running an eye over the instruments in the control console.  He should,
however, have Possibility of supplementing with accurate, detailed data as
easily as he can read the meters and recorders in conventional systems.
This detailed information should be easily obtainable in preferably digital
form with a c--ear indication of the name of the parameter and the
engineering unit, or as graphic curves showing the evolution of the parameter
in time; for instance the operator may call the information from his graphic
9patterns by means of a "light Dent'.  If the system is arranged so that it is only
possible for the operator to call detailed information from a survey pattern., it
can be avoided that he uses d(@tailed information without considering its
relation to the general conditions in the system,
Examples of a possible 3-ayout of such displays are shown at the end of the
report.  This type of dismay is today used especially in aviation systems; its
application in computer-aided design is developing rapidly, and the same
tendency is to be expected as to its use in process control systems.
The advantage of these Displays is not so much that they can be used to
give "mimic" diagrams, as known in conventional plants, but rather the
possibility of coding the information effectively in a symbolic form which the
operator can perceive as Patterns or pictures.
In the discussion given above the possibilities of the designer of analy8ing
in advance the reactions of the complete plant to the different types of failures
and the corresponding data- and alarm patterns is only utilized to provide a
basis for selection of the parameters of the plant that are to be monitored by
the alarm system, for the design of a simple alarm reduction function and for
the classification of data into appropriate sets for the graphic displays.
The capacity of the computers makes it attractive to support the operator
further with the results of the designers' previous analyses of the plant.  This
can be done by Incorporating in automatic procedure in the instrumentation,
which, initiated by an alarm, analyses the alarm and data patterns and
directly localizes the primary fault.  It may be extremely difficult, if not
impossible., for the designer of a large plant to carry through an analysis that
takes into account not only all failures in the plant itself and the
instrumentation, but also the combination of failures, which may cause
serious disturbances.
How far it pays to go J-n this direction in an actual plant depends upon
which situation is the more dangerous: that the operator in a given situation
doeE-1 not have sufficient knowledge about the nature and functioning of the
plant, or that the designer has not foreseen the situation during, the design
phase and has therefore not included it in the automatic analysis one has to
realize that direct automatic identification of the primary fault based on a not
completely covering analysis which assumes that an operator critically
evaluates the result of the analysis, involves a great risk of further decreasing
-the probability that the operator takes into consideration very improbable,
but hazardous failures not dealt with in the simplified analysis of ttie designer
and thus of the instrumentation.
If one utilizes a simplified analysis of failure conditions in this way,, one
may therefore be in the paradoxical situation that it as risky for the operator
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to trust the analysis -too much when it indicates a probable causes of the
failure as to Incline towards distrusting the analysis when it indicates an a
Driori improbable cause,
A better result will presumably be attained if the automatic analysis is
allowed to follow principles that the operator will immediately accept.  The
analysis should then, as the operator will be inclined to do., deal first with the
simple and most probable causes and currently keep the operator informed of
the result.
In the case of more frequent and routine failures one then obtains an
automatic identification of the failures, while in the case of more complicated
and rare failures the analysis will rapidly exclude the simple and trivial
causes.  This will save the operator's time so that he may concentrate on the
more rare and serious situations on the basis of a limitation of the
possibilities; thus it can be avoided that the operator forms a sequence of
preliminary hypotheses which he may not be willing to reject.
In this way the operator may acquire more faith in the analysis, and it will
suffice, when a new plant is put into operation., to incorporate a simple
automatic analysis since it can be gradually expanded according to the
operational experience gained: further the display function may be based
immediately on the conventional tradition.
When a failure has been identified in this way, a decision must be taken
concerning the appropriate corrective action.  This decision has to be based
upon detailed knowledge about, the trend of the operational conditions
resulting from the failure and the influence of the possible corrective actions
on the abnormal plant.  Knowledge of this category will not be kept up by the
operator to great extent during normal operation, and besides he has to make
his decision under mental pressure; thus a decision based upon common
knowledge and understanding of the principles underlying the plant Ray not
be reliable.
Like the automatic failure identification, an automatic decision function
must be based upon a thoroughly covering a priori analysis of the plant under
abnormal. conditions, and in many failure situations the decision will
therefore rest with the operator.  Automatic safety action will be necessary
against failure situations that are too dangerous for the plant and demands
very rapid counteraction.
Automatic safety actions have to be based on simple criterion that can be
automatized with highly reliable equipment and may be proved covering in all
circumstances by an analysis.  Therefore they must be simple but drastic
actions, capable in all circumstances of bringing the plant into a safe state,
for instance by emergency shut-down.  The operator will furnish a back-up for
this safety system and moreover will prevent less important failures from
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developing to such an extent as to initiate the safety system action and thus
interfere drastically with the operation.
The decisions of the operator in situations foreseen and evaluated by the
designer can be supported by instructions learned by the operator, but in
order to be reflex-like and reliable such knowledge must be kept up by
exercises.  It may be appropriate to incorporate in the instrumentation such
information as may support the operator's memory, for instance by making it
possible for him,, after the identification of the failure, to call comments in
clear text in em alphanumerical display.  In more definite situations the
operator may be supported by a computational function that gives him,  on a
fast time scale, the result of a simulation of the trend of the operational state
of the plant and the effect of his 4Lntended corrective actions.  This may be
required for his evaluation of necessary corrections in case of Xenon
poisoning in i nuclear reactor or "cold plugs" in a once through boiler.
Changes of the Operational State of the Plant
The problems of the operator in case of corrective intervention in the
operation of a failing plant are in some ways the same as those connected
with normal start-stop Procedures, which may also be very infrequent in
automatic plants.  In both cases the operator has to choose the correct
Procedure and to carry it through without mistakes.  The task of' the
instrumentation is in both cases to assist him in memorizing the procedure,
avoid mistakes in his manipulations and give him the possibility of judging
their influence on the plant.
Changes of the operational state, e.g. start-un, are in large plants
characterized by a complicated sequence of operations following a fixed
procedure; the sequence and the duration of the individual operations may
further depend upon the state of the plant.  The operator thus has to carry
through a complicated and often lengthy procedure, in some pants even at
rather long time intervals.
The operator should only carry out the individual manipulations after
checking that the necessary plant conditions are fulfilled and he should have
sufficient means for a check of the effect of the manipulations upon the plant.
The choice of the sequence of manipulations and the check of the necessary
conditions may be based on a learned or written procedure, which may be
present in the form of more or less detailed instructions.  The operator's
memory may be supported if the procedure is partly incorporated in the
control system as an interlock system.  This is to some extent the case in
conventional systems, and the great data handling capacity offered by digital
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commuters makes it attractive to increase this automatic interlock or let the
instrumentation directly control the sequence of operations.
The interlock function is today often preferred to the automatic control of
the sequence because it may be impossible or very difficult to carry through
an analysis sufficiently detailed in all circumstances of the sequence and the
necessary conditions for each step and the operator's evaluation of the
different situations may therefore be needed as a supplement to the function
of the instrumentation.  In both cases the operator has a monitoring task.,
and he therefore needs information that gives him a survey of the conditions
in the plant and its subsystems by means of displays with the same
characteristics as those mentioned in the discussion of his identification of a
failure, supplemented by information describing the state of the interlock
system., for instance textual information presented by means of a light
tableau or cathode ray tubes.
If the operator is responsible for the control action, the display system must
give him a feedback of information about the effect of the control actions upon
the plant.  To make sure that an operator having correct intentions chooses
the proper control knob, one attempts in conventional systems to give the
knobs and the corresponding meter indications characteristic forms and to
group them clearly according to their functions in such a way thal, the
operator sees the control console clearly divided into sub-systems and
functions and may thus immediately pick the right knob.
In large, modern plants like power stations, the control console is often very
extensive.  The designer tries to avcld this by centralizing the function:3 to
some degree in such a way that manipulations and monitoring of their effect
are carried out by a smaller number of devices whose functions are selected
by the, operator with switches.  This is not in accordance with the need for a
clear layout of the console, and it may be necessary to enable the operator to
check whether the instrumentation has accepted his order correctly before he
asks the system to carry it out.
This centralized layout is natural in particular if the presentation of
information to I;he operator is concentrated by the use of a digital computer;
it will be an obvious solution to use the varied display possibilities of the
digital computer to provide an effective control of the choice of orders.  A
survey display of the conditions in different parts and subsystems of the plant
may for instance serve to indicate what control actions and orders the
operator can use in the situation concerned.  He may choose the appropriate
order by means of e.g. a light pen, and the dismay may indicate how the order
has been accepted by the system before he executes the order by means of a
general "go" knob.
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In complicated plants, rapid and closely controlled start and stop
Procedures may be decisive for the economy and safety pf the plant, and the
procedures may be so complicated that manual operation is too risky.  The
trend is therefore towards a more extended use of automatic start, and stop
operations and the present development of the different types of digital data
processors seems to indicate that they will be used in future because of their
low price compared with that of tailored hardware systems.  The task of the
operator will therefore develop towards effective action in abnormal situations,
and maintenance,, but the demands on the instrumentation with respect to
furnishing the operator with information in an effective form will not decrease
even in highly automatized plants.
The thorough analysis of the function of the plant necessary for the
automatization of start-up and shut-down procedures. will contribute to the
basis for the evaluation that is a condition for the automatization of the choice
of proper corrective action in case of failures in the plant.  An effective
automatic control system, able to control the operation within a wide range of
conditions, is also a necessary condition for the application of automatic
intervention in case of failures and for a differentiation of these actions
beyond the choice between normal operation and complete shut-down.
Operation of the Control System
The highly concentrated layout of the control system and the dismay and
operational devices natural for computer-based systems require an expedient
layout of the operation of the control system itself.  I t is Important that the
operator is able to call a survey dismay with the same ease iiith which in
conventional systems he surveys the console, and it must be as simple for
him to get accurate data as to read a meter.
The electric typewriter, normally used with digital computers, is not an
appropriate tool for the operator in the tasks at regular intervals, e.g. every
hour, a complete recording of all measured data should be made on punched
or magnetic tape; in abnormal situations all alarm information together with
measured data for a suitable time period before the fault should be recorded;
likewise it may be convenient to record all the operations of the staff with
indication of time.  The operator may from time to time have comments to
make on the operation and plant condition, for instance at shift take-over,
and these comments should be included in the recorded material.
All this operational information may be sorted and processed off line.
Conclusion
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A discussion of the tasks of the operator at automatic process plants seems
to indicate that his need for information characterizing the operational state of
the plant may expediently be classified into three groups.  In the task of
optimalizing the normal operation he needs an accurate and clear
presentation of rather few primary operational data which may be easily
compared with the main specifications of the operation.  For normal
monitoring of the operation and for evaluation of the conditions of the plant in
case of failures it is essential for him to have a large amount of data presented
in a way that makes it easy and convenient for him to compare data
representative of the operational conditions in different systems, functions
and situations, and thus to establish an efficient survey.  Finally he must
have convenient access to accurate measured data 'and their trends in
support of more detailed evaluations of failure states.
Furthermore there will normally be a need to support the operator in his
identification and decision function under abnormal operational conditions.
This may be done by supporting his general knowledge of the plant and its
reaction by incorporating automatic analyses in the instrumentation, based
upon the analyses made by the system designer.
The data handling capacity of a control system utilizing a process computer
may be used with advantage both to code and reduce the information
presented to the operator and to carry out efficient analyses of abnormal
operational conditions.
It is very difficult to judge beforehand the importance of the different
aspects discussed here and their influence on the reliability of the human
operator.  The main reason for this is the adaptability of the operator, which
enables him to compensate to a very large extent for less appropriate layout of
the instrumentation.  Difficulties will only appear in process plants or in
situations in which the mental load on the operator is very heavy.
Explicitly formulated knowledge of the qualities of the human operator as a
part of a system is very limited; especially it does not cover all his functions.
The utilization of a new technology in the communication between operator
and plant should therefore be based on the experience from conventional
systems and the traditions of the operator of such systems, supplemented by
information from realistic experiments with the new technology.
As en example of a possible layout of a display system utilizing a-digital
computer are shown in the following pages a series of display formats which
are parts of an experiment at the Ris8 reactor DR2.  Here. especially
communication end traffic problems between operator and plant will be
studied, together with reliability problems and their dependence upon
structure of the system, e.g. upon different degrees of centralized structure.
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